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 The somber man in an authoritative uniform opens the cage he had put her in earlier. His 
uniform reminds her of the police back home. Based on her experience with the police in her 
country she does not trust this man, not only because of the mean look on his face, but also 
because he reminds her of the corruption she relates to the police. She has spent her time in her 
cage wracking her brain, trying to figure out why she is here, where is here, what is going to 
happen to her. She could not understand why they had taken her clothes and given her a drab 
orange uniform. She longs to ask a million questions, but does not know how to in the language 
of her captors. Her thoughts are accompanied by a fear of the unknown and frustration from the 
inability to understand what the guard and others have been saying.  
 The guard leads her to a bare room with a table, computer, and chair. She sits down in 
front of the monitor only after the guard motions her to sit. The computer flickers on, and a 
picture of a formal room appears on the screen and a small box mirroring her face occupies the 
corner. She has never seen a room like this before. A woman in a black robe sits in the middle 
facing her through the computer. She sees the side profile of a man at a table in front of the 
woman in the black robe. The people in the room are talking to each other in a ritualistic way, 
but she has no idea what they are saying. All of a sudden one of the people in the room looks 
straight at her through the computer and asks in her language “what is your name?” Baffled, but 
relieved to finally understand someone, she answers. She hears her name repeated. A few more 
questions are asked of her, but after the questions nothing more is said in her language, until the 
end, when the person asking the questions says in her language “your bond is set at $10,000, and 
your hearing is scheduled for . . . .“ She’s even more confused, frustrated, and scared. The guard 
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motions for her to follow him again, back to her cold, lonely cage, where she will be left to her 
thoughts and fears unable to even ask for help because she does not know the language.  
 This depiction highlights the probable experiences of detainees at the removal 
proceedings I witnessed as an immigration clinician while in law school. Notably, during those 
proceedings, only the questions asked of the detainees and the detainees’ answers were 
interpreted.
1
 I left the courtroom flustered, believing I had just witnessed a huge injustice, and 
confused because only a couple months prior to this experience I had observed a trial where the 
whole proceeding was translated into Spanish for two defendants who did not speak English as 
their first language.  
 I now recognize several differences between the removal proceedings I observed in the 
Detroit Immigration Court and the criminal trial I observed in the city district court in Reno, 
Nevada. The latter was a state criminal proceeding in the
 
Ninth Circuit, the former a federal civil 
proceeding in the Sixth Circuit. Although the differences are noteworthy, the similarities are 
substantial. The criminal defendants and detainee were jailed in between court dates. The 
possible outcomes of both proceedings were severe, with the criminal defendants facing restraint 
of liberty and the detainee facing banishment if found guilty. Both punishments resulted in huge 
impacts on every aspect of the defendants’ and detainee’s lives. The government brought the 
charges in both cases and was represented by a prosecutor in the criminal trial and an 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement trial attorney in the removal proceeding. Most 
significantly, both judicial proceedings involved a human being whose future rested on the 
outcome of the proceeding and who deserved the opportunity to understand what was happening 
to them. With such high stakes, the fundamental fairness of the United States justice system 
                                                        
1
 The fact that the detainees had to telecommute to the hearing and did not have adequate means of communicating 
with their lawyers, if they even had one, added to my shock. However, that is a topic for a different paper.  
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demands a right to full interpretation of a removal proceeding when English is not a person’s 
first language.  
 The injustice of those hearings haunted me as I worked for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. I witnessed entire proceedings interpreted for defendants 
charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
2
 As the land of opportunity, 
the United States attracts foreigners seeking the American dream and promises of a better life.  
However, foreign nationals who pursue that dream risk losing rights that even suspects of war 
crimes maintain. The right to full interpretation in a removal proceeding is fundamental to a fair 
judicial proceeding and is a humane courtesy that should be afforded to anyone in a judiciary 
proceeding against the government. Without the ability to understand judicial procedures meant 
to protect individual’s rights, all other rights are meaningless.  
 The right to interpretation in removal proceedings matters for four reasons. First, the 
United States justice system treats removal proceedings as civil matters.
3
 Therefore, the justice 
system should treat foreign nationals with civility, not worse than criminals. Second, in practice, 
removal proceedings more closely reflect criminal proceedings—resulting in restriction of 
liberties as punishment, imprisoning individuals while awaiting hearings, defending against 
government charges—and should afford foreign nationals the same protections afforded criminal 
defendants.
4
 Third, the reputation of America’s judicial system rests on foreign nationals’ 
perceptions of how we treat them in judicial proceedings. Without interpretation, the rest of the 
proceedings are left to the foreign national’s imagination strongly influenced by her experience 
with her home country’s judicial system. If her country does not provide due process, she has no 
                                                        
2
 International law guarantees a criminal defendant a right to an interpreter in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(3)(f), Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
3
 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 728-29 (1893) (holding deportation is civil in nature). 
4
 See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (finding deportation proceedings resulted in severe penalties). 
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reason to believe that our removal proceedings would protect her from arbitrary punishment, 
regardless of how much due process she is provided. Fourth, the right to interpretation is a matter 
of human decency because it can alleviate fear, worry, and frustration caused by the unknown. 
An American citizen facing judicial proceedings in another country would most likely appreciate 
an interpreter in order to understand the implications of the proceedings. The United States 
should provide the same generosity it expects from other nations. 
 This paper explores current laws and policies impacting the right to full interpretation in 
removal proceedings and provides suggestions on how to ensure that right is provided in all 
removal proceedings. Part I of this paper provides the background of interpretation in judicial 
proceedings. Part II will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the different laws and policies 
impacting the full right to interpretation. Part III will suggest ways to ensure that this right is 
protected. Multiple laws and policies already acknowledge the need for interpreters, but no 
policy or law currently protects foreign nationals from the terror of sitting through a formal 
proceeding without knowing what is taking place.  
I. BACKGROUND: INTERPRETATION IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS  
  In 1893, the Supreme Court did not address the right to interpretation 
directly, but rather made a decision that would impact the rights of foreign nationals in 
removal proceedings for years to come.5 In Fong Yue Ting, the Court held deportation 
hearings are civil, not criminal, matters.
6
 The Court found the elements of a civil case were met 
when an executive officer brought, on behalf of the United States and before a judge, an action 
against a foreign national to determine whether the person has the right to stay in the United 
                                                        
5
 See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 728-29 (1893). 
6




 This ruling had huge implications on foreign nationals because parties in civil cases who 
do not speak or understand English are not afforded the same constitutional guarantees as 
criminal defendants.
8
 Because the Supreme Court classified immigration proceedings as civil, 
foreign nationals who find themselves in removal proceedings have been afforded fewer rights 
than those who find themselves in criminal proceedings.
9
 In 1984, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the 
idea that removal proceedings are civil in nature when it opined that deportation hearings offer 
“merely a streamlined determination” of a foreign national’s eligibility to remain in the United 
States and have no punitive purpose.
10
 
 Fifty years after Fong Yue Ting, the Supreme Court acknowledged the similarities 
between removal proceedings and criminal proceedings, but did not explicitly overrule Fong Yue 
Ting to change the nature of immigration law from civil to criminal.
11
 The Court noted “though 
deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding [sic] it visits a great hardship on the 
individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom.”12 In 
finding this, the Court acknowledged that deportation was a serious penalty and opined that 
“[m]eticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by which he is deprived of that liberty 
not meet the essential standards of fairness.”13 The Court went from believing that deportation 
did not have penalties to recognizing that it did. Thirty-five years later, a Ninth Circuit dissenting 
                                                        
7
 Id. (finding that no formal complaint or pleading is required and the lack either does not affect the judge’s 
authority or the statute’s validity and that the elements of a civil case include a complainant, a defendant, and a 
judge).  
8
 The Hon. Josefina M Rendon, The Court of Babel: The Multilingual Courtroom of the Future, 50 APR HOUS. 
LAW. 26, 28 (2013). 
9
 Donna Ackerman, A Matter of Interpretation: How the Language Barrier and the Trend of Criminalizing 
Immigration Caused a Deprivation of Due Process Following the Agriprocessors, Inc. Raids, 43 COLUM.J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 363, 380 (2010) (citing DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW 
AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 519 (5th ed. 2005) (“[N]on-citizens have never been found to be deserving 
of significant protection and apparently can be disadvantaged with little or no justification.”)).  
10
 El Rescate Legal Serv. v. EOIR, 959 F.2d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 
1039 (1984). 
11
 Bridges, 326 U.S. at 154 (1945). 
12
 Id.   
13
 Id.  
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judge in Tejeda-Mata, fully aware of the civil nature of deportation proceedings, reiterated the 
Court’s finding that deportation proceedings resulted in criminal penalties when he argued that 
“it is undeniable . . . that deportation hearings are ‘fraught with serious consequences to the 
alien.’” 14  Although the Court recognized deportation proceedings and criminal proceedings 
could lead to the deprivation of liberty, the Court did not provide an avenue for foreign nationals 
to gain full rights granted to criminal defendants, but did call for procedural protection.
15
  
 In 1970, the Second Circuit finally faced the issue of interpretation in judicial 
proceedings in Negron. In that case, the court held that the integrity of the justice system forbids 
the prosecution of an individual who was functionally not present at his trial due to the lack of 
interpretation of the proceedings.
16
 The court opined “[c]onsiderations of fairness, the integrity 
of the fact-finding process, and the potency of our adversary system of justice forbid that the 
state should prosecute a defendant who is not present at his own trial.”17 The Second Circuit 
recognized the defendant, a twenty-three year old indigent with a sixth grade Puerto Rican 
education who did not speak or understand English well, most likely experienced the trial as a 
“babble of voices.”18 The court pointed to the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to be 
confronted with adverse witnesses and opined that it included “the right to cross-examine those 
witnesses as ‘an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this 
country’s constitutional goal.’”19  Most importantly, the court recognized the central issue—
human decency—when it stated “but as to a matter of simple humaneness, Negron deserved 
                                                        
14
 Tejada-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 729 (1980) (Ferguson, J. dissenting) (quoting Castaneda-Delgado v. INS, 525 
F.2d 1295, 1301 (7th Cir. 1975).  
15
 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. at 154. 
16
 Laura K. Abel, Language Access in the Federal Courts, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 593, 603 (2013). 
17
 Id. at 603.  
18
 Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 388-89 (1970). 
19
 Id. at 389 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965)). 
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more than to sit in total incomprehension as the trial proceeded.” 20  The court chastised 
“[p]articularly inappropriate in this nation where many languages are spoken is a callousness to 
the crippling language handicap of a newcomer to its shores, whose life and freedom the state by 
its criminal processes chooses to put in jeopardy.”21 The court recognized the ridiculous nature 
of expecting a foreigner with low education and little understanding of the English language and 
judicial system to comprehend the concept and traditions of our judicial proceedings.
22
 It opined  
[n]or are we inclined to require that an indigent, poorly educated 
Puerto Rican thrown into a criminal trial as his initiation to our 
trial system, come to that trial with a comprehension that the nature 
of our adversarial processes is such that he is in peril of forfeiting 
even the rudiments of a fair proceeding unless he insists upon 
them. For all that appears, Negron, who was clearly unaccustomed 
to asserting “personal rights” against the judicial arm of the state, 
may well not have had the slightest notion that he had any “rights” 
or any “privilege” to assert them.23  
 
The court further found that the language barrier was an obvious disability, and it was “as 
debilitating to his ability to participate in the trial as a mental disease or defect.”24 Because 
Negron was a criminal case, the Second Circuit’s findings do not carry over to civil proceedings, 
including removal proceedings, which are civil in nature.
25
 However, the right to a removal 
proceeding has no meaning if the individual does not have a right to be present, and without the 
ability to comprehend the proceeding, the individual cannot be present.
26
  
                                                        
20
 Negron, 434 F.2d at 390. 
21
 Id. at 390. 
22
 Id.  
23
 Id. (“At the hearing before Judge Bartels, Negron testified: ‘I knew that I would have liked to know what was 
happening but I did not know that they were supposed to tell me.’”). 
24
 Negron, 434 F.2d at 390. 
25
 See id.; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. at 728-29 (holding deportation was civil in nature).  
26
 See Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 728 (Ferguson, J. dissenting).  
 8 
 Seven years after Negron, the United States signed the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR).
27
 Article 14(3)(f) of the ICCPR guarantees the right to 
interpretation for criminal defendants who do not speak the language of the court.
28
 This right 
falls under the right to a fair trial in this treaty.
29
 However, the ICCPR does not provide a right to 
an interpreter when a criminal defendant would prefer to speak another language (like his native 
language) if that individual understands or speaks the court’s language.30 If a court finds a need 
for an interpreter, the criminal defendant does not have to pay for the assistance.
31
 The ICCPR’s 
guarantee of an interpreter is limited to criminal defendants and does not expand to civil 
proceedings.
32
 If removal proceedings were recognized as criminal in nature, this treaty would 
apply to them.
 33
 But because removal proceedings are treated like civil proceedings, the 
ICCPR’s guarantees do not apply.34  
 In 1978, Congress responded to Negron and the issue of interpretation in judicial 
proceedings by enacting the Court Interpreters Act.
35
 The statute requires the Director of the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts to establish a program that facilitates the use 
of “qualified interpreters in judicial proceedings instituted by the United States.”36 A judge is 
required to use a qualified interpreter in such proceedings “if the presiding judicial officer 
determines . . . that [a] party . . . speaks only or primarily a language other than the English 
                                                        
27
 Office of the High Commissioner, Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS 
(2014) http://indicators.ohchr.org. The United States did not ratify this treaty until June 8, 1992. Id.  
28
 ICCPR, supra note 2, at art. 14(3)(f).  
29
 Id.  
30
 See comments of United Nations Human Rights Committee in Bihan v. France [communication 221/1987, UN 
document CCPR/C/41/D/221/1987 at 43 (1991)] and Barzhig v. France [communication 327/1988, UN document 
CCPR/C/41/D/327/1988 at 92 (1991)]. 
31
 ICCPR, supra note 2, at art. 14(3)(f). 
32
 Id.  
33
 See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (recognizing that removal proceedings shared similarities with 
criminal proceedings).  
34
 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 728-29 (1893) (holding that deportation was a civil matter). 
35
 Abel, supra note 16, at 603.  
36
 28 U.S.C. § 1827(a) (2015). 
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language . . . so as to inhibit such party’s comprehension of the proceedings or communication 
with counsel or the presiding judicial officer.” 37  Unfortunately, the Eleventh and Seventh 
Circuits found that the Court Interpreter Act was not meant “to create new constitutional rights 
for defendants or expand existing constitutional safeguards,” but rather “to mandate the 
appointment of interpreters under certain conditions and to establish statutory guidance for the 
use of translators in order to ensure that the quality of the translation does not fall below a 
constitutionally permissible threshold.”38  
 Furthermore, district judges are given wide discretion in whether an interpreter is needed 
because defendants do not possess an automatic right to an interpreter under the statute.
39
 In 
order to determine whether a defendant has a statutory entitlement to an appointed interpreter, 
the district court must evaluate the defendant’s knowledge of English and the complexity of the 
proceedings and testimony along with a variety of other factors after being put on notice that the 
defendant only speaks or primarily speaks a language other than English.
40
 The First, Fifth, 
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits found that the Act places a mandatory duty on the trial 
court to “inquire as to the need for an interpreter when a defendant has difficulty with English.”41 
After evaluating the necessary factors, the court determines (1) whether the defendant “speaks 
                                                        
37
 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1)(A) (2015).  
38
 United States v. Joshi, 896 F. 2d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 1990), (finding no error when defendants could only 
communicate with their attorneys through the one court-appointed interpreter during requested breaks in testimony, 
but had the benefit of simultaneous interpretation to ensure the defendants could comprehend the proceeding), 
certiorari denied, 498 U.S. 986; United States v. Johnson, 248 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2001).    
39
 See United States v. Johnson, 248 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2001).  
40
 Id. at 661 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Febus, 218 F. 3d 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2000)).  
41
 Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 
1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1980)) (emphasis added); United States v. Osuna, 189 F.3d 1289, 1292 (10th Cir. 1999); Luna 
v. Black, 772 F.2d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that a trial court should determine whether an interpreter is 
needed when put on notice that there may be some significant language difficulties); United States v. Carrion, 488 
F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1973) (holding that “whenever put on notice that there may be some significant language 
difficulty, the court should make such a determination of need [for an interpreter]”). (1337-1338). 
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only or primarily a language other than the English language[,]” and (2) whether “this fact 
inhibits [the defendant’s] comprehension of the proceedings or communication with counsel.”42 
 In determining whether the defendant “speaks only or primarily a language other than the 
English language[,]” simply asking whether the defendant’s native language is a language other 
than English is not sufficient, neither is basing the decision on the language the defendant speaks 
most frequently.
43
 The Tenth Circuit has found that the statute “seeks to measure the defendant’s 
comparative ability to speak English.” 44  Evidence of this ability includes the individual 
responding consistently and clearly in English to questions asked in English, regardless of 
whether the answers are brief and somewhat inarticulate.
45
 Furthermore, a defendant’s ability to 
converse with a judge during a hearing and long statements made under oath to agents can 
support the finding that a defendant understands and speaks English.
46
 However, if a defendant is 
arraigned through an interpreter or testifies through an interpreter, the court should, through its 
own motion, inquire into whether failure to provide an interpreter inhibited the defendant’s 
“comprehension of proceedings and communications with counsel.”47 Furthermore, the court can 
be put on notice of the defendant’s difficulty with English if the court reporter notes the 
defendant’s testimony is unintelligible or evidence exists that clearly shows that communication 
between the court and the defendant, or counsel and the defendant, is inhibited by language.
48
    
                                                        
42
 Johnson, 248 F.3d at 661.  
43
 United States v. Hasan, 526 F.3d 653, 666 (10th Cir. 2008).  
44
 Id.  
45
 United States v. Black, 369 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that even though witness would have been 
more comfortable testifying in the Navajo language, her lengthy testimony showed she did not have difficulty with 
the English language and her clear and responsive answers demonstrated her fluency in English); Gonzales v. United 
States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to an interpreter because his 
answers were responsive and he never indicated to the court that he was experiencing major difficulty).  
46
 United States v. Birdinground, 107 Fed.Appx. 806, 807 2004 WL 1894986 (finding that defendant’s 
comprehension of the proceedings was not inhibited by language issues because his colloquy with the judge and his 
lengthy statement to United States Attorney’s office agents under oath evidenced defendant understood and spoke 
English). 
47
 Tapia, 631 F.2d at 1209.  
48
 Black, 369 F.3d at 1175.  
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 The statute also requires that interpretation provided by a certified interpreter must be in 
the simultaneous mode for any party in a judicial proceeding instituted by the United States.
49
 In 
U.S. v. Joshi, the Eleventh Court found that the Court Interpreters Act’s general standard 
required word-for-word translation of everything relating to trial that an English speaking 
individual would be privy to hear to satisfy the adequate translation of trial proceedings.
50
 
However, the court also found that occasional lapses, particularly those that the defendant does 
not object to, do not render the trial fundamentally unfair.
51
 
 A “judicial proceeding instituted by the United States” refers to all criminal or civil 
proceedings, including pretrial and grand jury proceedings, “conducted in, or pursuant to the 
lawful authority and jurisdiction of a United States district court.” 52  Therefore, the Court 
Interpreters Act does not require interpretation of transcripts of conversations outside the judicial 
proceedings, of meeting of creditors and discharge hearings in bankruptcy court, nor post-plea-
debriefings interpreted by informal interpreters.
53
 The Court Interpreters Act does not govern 
interpretation matters in removal proceedings, because the Act does not refer to immigration 
courts nor has a court decided that the Act applies to immigration courts.
54
  
                                                        
49
 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (k) (2015).  
50




 28 U.S.C. § 1827(j) (2015) (“The term “United States district court” as used in this subsection includes any court 
which is created by an Act of Congress in a territory and is invested with any jurisdiction of a district court 
established by chapter 5 of this title.”).  
53
 United States v. Lira-Arredondo, 38 F.3d 531, 533 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding that the CIA was not applicable to 
instances transcripts prepared outside of the judicial proceeding); In re Morrison, 22 B.R. 969 (U.S. Bankr. Ct. N.D. 
Ohio 1982) (finding interpreters were not required in creditors’ meeting and discharge hearings in bankruptcy 
court); United States v. Acuna-Navarro, 90 Fed. Appx. 308, 312-14 (finding that a court appointed interpreter was 
not required under the CIA in a debriefing where an informal translator was used).  
54
 See 28 U.S.C. § 1827(j) (2015) (“The term “United States district court” as used in this subsection includes any 
court which is created by an Act of Congress in a territory and is invested with any jurisdiction of a district court 
established by chapter 5 of this title.”); United States v. Lira-Arredondo, 38 F.3d 531, 533 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding 
that the CIA was not applicable to instances transcripts prepared outside of the judicial proceeding); In re Morrison, 
22 B.R. 969 (U.S. Bankr. Ct. N.D. Ohio 1982) (finding interpreters were not required in creditors’ meeting and 
discharge hearings in bankruptcy court); United States v. Acuna-Navarro, 90 Fed. Appx. 308, 312-14 (finding that a 
court appointed interpreter was not required under the CIA in a debriefing where an informal translator was used). 
 12 
 In determining whether a court violated the Court Interpreters Act, the reviewing court 
ultimately determines whether failure to provide an interpreter or any inadequacy in 
interpretation made the trial fundamentally unfair.
55
 The court focuses on whether the purposes 
of the Court Interpreters Act were adequately met, and as long as the purposes were met, 
appropriate use of interpreters in a courtroom falls within the discretion of the district court.
56
 
Being in the best position to evaluate the need for interpreters due to the direct contact the judge 
has with the defendant, the district courts are afforded wide discretion when implementing the 
Court Interpreters Act and deciding the extent and nature of interpretation services needed.
57
     
Since 1980, the Circuit Courts have wrestled with determining the role of the right to 
interpretation of judicial proceedings. In 1980, the Second Circuit found a substantive 
entitlement to due process protection in asylum cases—a type of removal proceeding.58 It held 
that “the statute authorizing aliens to petition for relief from deportation or return to a country in 
which their life or freedom would be jeopardized, creates a substantive entitlement to which due 
process protections apply.”59 The court also found that “[a]t a minimum, . . .  [limited English 
proficient] petitioners must be afforded a hearing at which interpretation is provided, sufficient to 
enable them to understand the proceedings and present their claims.” 60  Although this case 
provides substance to argue limited English proficient individuals in removal proceedings should 
have a right to interpretation, the case seems to speak only to asylum seekers, and not all 
individuals in removal proceedings are asylum seekers.  
                                                        
55
 United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1455 (6th Cir. 1991); Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1566 
(11th Cir. 1989). 
56
 United States v. Mosquera, 816 F.Supp. 168, 174  (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Sanchez, 928 F.2d at 1455. 
57
 Mosquera, 816 F.Supp. at 174; Valladares, 871 F.2d at 1566; United States v. Sandoval, 347 F.3d 627, 632 (Ill. 
2003).  
58
 Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 38 (2d Cir. 1984). 
59
 Id.  
60
 Id.  
 13 
The Circuit Courts have also found interpretation is essential to issues of due process, 
equal protection, court access, right to a fair trial, right to be present at trial, right to confront 
witnesses, and right to effective assistance of counsel.
61
 Many courts have held that the right to 
an interpreter implicates these issues, but only in criminal proceedings.
62
 Specifically, the 
Eleventh and Fifth Circuits have found that the right to an interpreter implicates due process.
63
 In 
Edouard, the court stated “[a]s a constitutional matter, in determining whether an interpreter is 
needed, the trial court must balance the defendant’s rights to due process, confrontation of 
witnesses, effective assistance of counsel, and to be present at his trial ‘against the public’s 
interest in the economical administration of criminal law.’”64 The Ninth Circuit has expanded the 
application of the Fifth Amendment due process clause to removal proceedings, requiring the 
granting of a full and fair hearing to a foreign national facing removal.
65
  
In another case, the Ninth Circuit spoke to the right of interpretation when it held 
competent translation is fundamental to a full and fair hearing, and deportation proceedings must 
be translated into a language the foreign national understands if he or she does not speak 
English.
66
 The court further explained that an incorrect or incomplete translation is functionally 
equivalent to no translation at all.
67
 Immigration proceedings rely heavily on oral testimony of 
the respondent because evidence and witnesses can be hard to obtain due to the likeliness they 
                                                        
61
 See Abel, supra note 16, at 603. 
62
 See Id. (citing United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases holding that an 
interpreter may be necessary to allow a defendant to confront witnesses); United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 
(1st Cir. 1973) (stating that the denial of an interpreter can interfere with the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel).” 
63
 United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1338 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Martinez, 616 F.2d 185, 188 
(5th Cir. 1980) (discussing the right to an interpreter when due process is implicated). 
64
 Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Valladares, 871 F.2d at 1566 (citing Martinez, 616 F.2d at 188)). 
65
 Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 339–40 (9th Cir.1994) (citing Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49–50 
(1950)); Ramirez v. INS, 550 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1977).  
66




can only be found outside the country. Therefore, the need for a foreign national to understand 
the questions and to communicate clear answers is that much more important.
68
 
 In 1983, the Attorney General created a separate agency within the United States 
Department of Justice called the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) to adjudicate 
cases arising under the Immigration and Nationality Act and its regulations.
69
 The Office of the 
Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ) comprises one of the three administrative tribunals of the EOIR 
and maintains about 59 immigration courts whose primary purpose is to adjudicate cases 
involving the removal of aliens from the United States.
70
 A second administrative tribunal in the 
EOIR, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reviews appeals from the immigration courts.
71
 
Following BIA ruling, an appeal may be heard by circuit courts with jurisdictional authority 
where the initial removal proceeding took place.
72
 Therefore, the EOIR manages the operations 
of immigration courts and each court is bound by the Circuit Court that governs their 
geographical location.  
In 1991, a legal services organization brought a class action lawsuit against EOIR for 
failing to provide full and competent interpretation for non-English speakers at immigration 
court proceedings.
73
 El Rescate Legal Services argued that this failure deprived foreign nationals 
of their statutory rights to present evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, and to be represented 
                                                        
68
 See Hartooni, 21 F.3d at 340 (finding a hearing is not “full and fair” unless the proceedings are “competently 
translated into a language [the foreign national] can understand.”) (emphasis added); Augustin, 735 F.2d at 37 
(“[T]ranslation services must be sufficient to enable the applicant to place his claim before the judge. A hearing is of 
no value when the alien and the judge are not understood.”); Gonzales v. Zurbrick, 45 F.2d 934, 937 (6th Cir.1930) 
(“The right to a hearing is a vain thing if the alien is not understood.”). 
69
 Exec. Office for Immigration Review, Plan for Ensuring Limited English Proficient Persons Have Meaningful 
Access to EOIR Services 1 (2012), available at http:// www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/EOIRLanguageAccessPlan.pdf 
[hereinafter EOIR LEP Plan].   
70
 Id.  
71
 Exec. Office for Immigration Review, Board of Immigration Appeals, DEPT. OF JUSTICE (2016), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals. 
72
 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2), (b)(7)(C) (2015).  
73
 El Rescate Legal Serv. v. EOIR, 941 F.2d 950, 952 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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and effectively assisted by retained counsel.
74
 The Ninth Circuit found the statutory provisions 
only required a foreign national have a reasonable opportunity to be present, present evidence, 
and to cross-examine witnesses, and the EOIR’s refusal to provide full interpretation did not 
deny a reasonable opportunity to exercise those statutory rights.
75
  The Ninth Circuit reiterated 
that the Constitution affords foreign nationals inside the United States in deportation hearings 
(now referred to as removal hearings) to procedural due process, which is satisfied through a full 
and fair hearing.
76
 The court found that neither the Immigration and Nationality Act, nor the 
Attorney General’s regulatory scheme, required full interpretation of the entire deportation 
proceedings.
77
 However, since the El Rescate case, the provision in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act that provided the statutory rights has been amended to no longer afford such 
rights.  
 In 1995, the Judicial Conference of the United States warned “[a]s the number of non-
English speakers and the number of languages spoken in the U.S. population increase, the courts 
will be challenged as they seek to ensure the integrity of the truth-finding process.”78 Several 
federal circuit committees emphasized the importance of interpreters in civil courts.
79
 The task 
force for the Second Circuit warned “’[w]ithout interpretation, non-English speakers sit in 
federal court as an incomprehensible storm of events swirl around them.’”80 The National Center 
for State Courts also insists that courts appoint interpreters when the “services of an interpreter 
are required to secure the rights of non-English speaking persons or for the administration of 
                                                        
74
 Id.  
75
 Id. at 955-56. 
76
 El Rescate Legal Serv. v. EOIR (El Rescate II), 959 F.2d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 1991). 
77
 Id. at 752. 
78
 Judicial Conference of the U.S., Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts 116 (1995), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/Publications/FederalCourtsLongRangePlan.pdf. 
79
 Abel, supra note 16, at 601. 
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Fairness in the Courts, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 117, 289-90).  
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justice.”81 The National Center for State Courts commented that even though many individuals 
have enough proficiency in a second language to communicate at a very basic level, a much 
higher level of communicative capability is required for participation in court proceedings.
82
  
 On August 11, 2000, President Clinton issued Executive Order No. 13,166 (Order), 
which addresses the issue of English proficiency.
83
 The purpose of the Order was “to improve 
access to federally conducted and federally assisted programs and activities for persons who, as a 
result of national origin, are limited in their English proficiency.
84
 Limited English proficient 
(LEP) persons are “[i]ndividuals who do not speak English as their primary language and who 
have a limited ability to read, write, speak, or understand English.” 85  Although some LEP 
persons might be competent in certain types of communication (i.e. listening, speaking, reading, 
or writing), they may still be LEP due to other reasons (i.e. listening, speaking, reading, or 
writing).
86
 The Order required each federal agency to examine its provided services, develop a 
system that allows LEP persons to meaningfully access its services, and implement it.
87
 The 
Order recognizes that these new systems should not unduly burden the fundamental mission of 
the agency.
88
 The Order’s intention was to improve internal management of the executive branch 
and does not create a substantive or procedural right enforceable by law.
89
  
 In 2010, the Department of Justice started pressuring state courts to use interpreters in 
civil proceedings, warning that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act requires them to provide an 
interpreter when an individual lacks sufficient English proficiency to meaningfully participate in 
                                                        
81
 Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, Court Interpretation: Model Guides for Policy and Practice in the State Courts 226 
(1995), available at http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/accessfair/id/162/rec/19. 
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 Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121 (Aug. 11, 2000).  
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 State courts that receive federal funds are required to provide interpreters 
in all civil cases under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
91
 The Supreme Court has found 
violations of the Civil Rights Act in educational situations that had to do with matters similar to 
the right of interpretation.
92
 For example, recognizing that the discrimination fostered by the San 
Francisco’s public schools’ failure to provide instructions in Chinese to Chinese-speaking 
students who did not speak any English, the Supreme Court held that these schools violated Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
93
 The Court opined “[i]t seems obvious that the Chinese-
speaking minority receive fewer benefits than the English-speaking majority from respondents’ 
school system which denies them a meaningful opportunity to participate in the educational 
program—all earmarks of the discrimination banned by the regulations.” 94  The Court also 
acknowledged “[s]imple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races 
contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in 
racial discrimination.”95  
 In 2011, in an attempt to recommit to the implementation of Executive Order 13,166, the 
Attorney General issued a memorandum explaining it.
96
 The Attorney General reiterated that 
agencies must develop and implement a system that provides meaningful access to the services 
of the federal agencies to limited English proficient persons.
97
 Meaningful access for LEP 
persons in immigration proceedings would include language assistance resulting in accurate, 
                                                        
90
 Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen.. to Chief Justices & State Court Adm’rs (Aug. 16, 2010), 
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timely, and effective communication at no cost to the LEP person and access that is not 
restricted, delayed, or inferior to programs or activities afforded English proficient individuals.
98
 
The Attorney General requested agencies to ensure that staff is able to competently identify LEP 
contact situations and take steps necessary to provide meaningful access.
99
 The memorandum 
further directed agencies to evaluate and update their current response to LEP needs and 
suggested, among other things, that agencies conduct an inventory of most frequently 
encountered languages, identify primary channels used to contact LEP community members, and 
review language accessibility of programs and activities.
100
 Another request was that the 
agencies use mechanisms to reach the LEP communities they serve to notify the public of the 
agencies’ policies, plans, procedures, and access-related developments for LEP individuals.101  
 In response to the Attorney General’s memorandum and the Executive Order’s request, 
the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) created The Executive Office for 
Immigration Review’s Plan for Ensuring Limited Proficient Persons have Meaningful Access to 
EOIR Services.
102
 In its plan, the EOIR acknowledged that the nature of its mission has created a 
long history of interacting with LEP persons.
103
 The EOIR’s mission is to “strive[] to provide 
fair, impartial, and timely adjudication of immigration proceeding” as a neutral arbiter.104 The 
EOIR expressed that ensuring meaningful access to immigration proceedings to LEP persons is 
fundamental to its goals.
105
 In an effort to provide meaningful access to its services, the EOIR 
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 The EOIR also acknowledged that many foreign nationals in removal proceedings are 
limited in English proficiency and need an interpreter to understand and participate in the 
proceedings.
107
 To ensure meaningful access to its most critical service, the EOIR has the 
following policy in place: “[i]nterpreters are provided at government expense to individuals 
whose command of the English language is inadequate to fully understand and participate in 
removal proceedings. In general, the Immigration Court endeavors to accommodate the language 
needs of all respondents.”108 The EOIR also promises “EOIR staff will take reasonable steps to 
effectively inform the public of the availability of EOIR’s language assistance resources.”109 
Through its policy directive, the EOIR intends to eliminate or reduce the barrier of limited 
English proficiency to its services by establishing guidelines consistent with Title VI of the Civil 




 According to the EOIR, the immigration courts already arrange interpreters for master 
calendar hearings and individual hearings.
111
 Although the EOIR encourages parties to request 
interpreters orally or through written motions, immigration judges will determine the need for an 
interpreter regardless of whether the foreign national requests one.
112
 Along with training on how 
to ascertain the best language a foreign national understands, immigration judges are provided 
scripted questions in the Immigration Judge Bench Book to determine whether a foreign national 
                                                        
106
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needs an interpreter and the language the foreign national best speaks, and immigration judges 
usually ask these questions at every hearing.
113
 The EOIR provides staff with the following 
guidelines to assist in identifying LEP individuals: (1) asking what the person’s primary 
language is, (2) having the person self-identify or a companion identify the person as LEP, (3) 
requesting a multi-lingual employee or qualified interpreter to verify the primary language of the 
person, and (4) using an “I speak” language identification card.114  
 In 2012, the EOIR employed 90 staff interpreters and contracted with a private company 
to provide interpreters in whatever language the immigration courts need.
115
 For immediate 
needs, EOIR also contracted with two telephonic interpreter services.
116
 Under the language 
access plan, the EOIR promises to continue furnishing interpreters at all immigration 
proceedings where a party is an LEP person.
117
 Furthermore, the EOIR has promised that within 
one year of adoption of the language access plan, interpreters—when present at an immigration 
proceeding—will provide a full and complete interpretation of the proceeding.118 
 Although the EOIR’s directive recognizes that adequate interpretation is fundamental to 
meaningful access to the immigration courts, it directly says in its plan that the “directive is 
intended only to improve the internal management of EOIR’s language access program, and does 
not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party 
against the United States, its agencies, its officers or employees, or any person.”119 In order to 
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raise any concern about the implementation of the EOIR’s policy, an individual must submit 
relevant information to the language access coordinator of the EOIR.
120
 
 Around the same time as the EOIR issued its plan, the American Bar Association 
delivered new standards for Language Access in Courts.
121
 This ABA standard is intended to 
apply to all adjudicatory tribunals and urges tribunals to “ensure that persons with limited 
English proficiency have meaningful access to all the services . . . provided by the court.”122 The 
ABA standards encourage courts to provide interpreters in all types of cases, including civil 
ones.
123
 These standards recognize that without competent interpreters, LEP persons are forced 
to proceed in court without the ability to participate effectively in their own proceedings.
124
 Lack 
of competent interpreters in all judicial proceedings can result in crucial laws going unenforced, 
vulnerable immigrants being exploited, court inefficiency due to inability to communicate, and 
members of the community losing faith in the ability of the courts to administer justice.
125
  
The ABA’s movement toward expanding the right to an interpreter in civil proceedings is 
supported by some strong arguments. For example, when the governing law or likely evidence in 
civil cases are too complicated for laypeople to understand, courts may need to provide 
appropriate assistance, including “a form identifying the critical issues, a mental health 
professional to explain expert testimony, or an ‘institutional attorney’ to help prisoners file 
habeas corpus petitions.
126
 Furthermore, courts might need to provide accommodations to allow 
                                                        
120
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people with disabilities to access the court, regardless of whether the matter is civil or 
criminal.
127
 Federal LEP prison inmates have been afforded interpreters for disciplinary hearings 
when federal district courts held due process requires it.
128
 Limited English proficient people 
who find themselves in immigration proceedings are like individuals with a disability or the 
laypeople who need psychological evaluations explained to them and deserve professional 
assistance—an interpreter—in understanding the judicial proceeding.129  Like the LEP prison 
inmate who has a right to an interpreter even at disciplinary proceedings, foreign nationals in 
removal proceedings have a right to interpretation of the entire judicial process.
130
 Without a full 
and complete interpretation of immigration proceedings, the foreign national is denied access to 
justice, which the ABA tries to remedy. 
 The ABA standards also specified that a court must provide an interpreter when an 
individual’s English language capabilities are insufficient to allow meaningful communication 
and comprehension within a “fast-pace, potentially jargon-laden, and emotionally taxing legal 
proceeding.”131 Directly asking whether a litigant speaks and understands English will likely 
elicit a “yes” from people too embarrassed, nervous, or scared to admit difficulty with the 
national language, or the litigant might not know what level of English is required to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
questions about his ability to pay); Murray v. Giarrantano, 492 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
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meaningfully communicate in a courtroom setting, especially if the litigant is unfamiliar with 
courtroom culture.
132
   
In 2016, the possibility of foreign nationals finding themselves in removal proceedings 
even though they are not actually subject to removal is high enough that due process requires 
protection of these individuals. The Department of Homeland Security announced that U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) initiated a total of 462,463 removals/returns in the 
2015 fiscal year.
133
 In a year, hundreds of thousands of people find themselves in removal 
proceedings and detained while waiting for these proceedings to occur.
134
 Of the 462,463 
removals initiated, ICE removed/returned 235,413 individuals.
135
 That seems to indicate that 
227,050 individuals who have gone through removal proceedings were not actually removed or 
returned. If that is the case, immigration proceedings affect many individuals who were found to 
have a right to stay. Similar to how individuals in the criminal justice system may be wrongfully 
accused, foreign nationals or lawful residents might find themselves wrongfully in removal 
proceedings.
136
 Therefore, safeguards are needed to protect the rights of those who have been 
wrongfully put into removal proceedings, and the most fundamental safe guard is full 
interpretation of removal proceedings.  
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 Furthermore, ICE continually declares a commitment to focus on the removal of 
convicted criminals and those posing a threat to public safety within the United States.
137
 The 
agency’s focus on criminals means the consequences from the immigration proceedings are 
significant. If removal proceedings are focused on removal of criminal foreign nationals, the 
stakes are high and the likelihood for abuse is possible, requiring that rights found applicable to 
criminal hearings should be applicable to removal proceedings. The fact that some non-criminal 
foreign nationals find themselves in removal proceedings does not require less rights, but rather 
more because stakes are still high, and the likelihood of wrongfully removing an individual for 
illegal presence is also high. 
II. STRENGTHS & WEAKNESSES OF LAWS GOVERNING THE RIGHT TO INTERPRETATION 
 The background evidenced a variety of legal sources—ranging from statutes to executive 
policies—that acknowledge the need and implications of a competent interpreter for limited 
English proficient individuals.
138
 However, adequate protection for the right to interpretation in 
removal proceedings does not exist.
139
 Each area of law discussed falls short in one way or 
another.
140
 Starting with the strongest enforceable law, this section will analyze the strengths and 
weaknesses of various laws affecting the right to interpretation.
141
 Interestingly, the laws or 
policies with the weakest enforcement offer the most rights and protections in regards to an 




                                                        
137
 DHS Press Office, supra note 133. 
138
 See supra Part I.  
139
 See supra Part I.  
140
 See supra Part II.A.-D. 
141
 See infra Part II.A.-D. 
142
 See infra Part II.A.-D. 
 25 
A. Statutory Law: Court Interpreters Act  
 
 Ideally, Congress would have created guidelines and provided a right to an interpreter for 
immigration proceedings in the Immigration and Nationality Act. Second best, Congress could 
clearly guarantee a right to interpretation for limited English proficient individuals in legislation 
that guided all federal courts, including immigration courts. The closest reality to this second 
best ideal is the Court Interpreters Act enacted in response to the Second Circuit case, Negron.
143
 
 As a statute, the Court Interpreters Act is the strongest source of law available pertaining 
to interpretation of judicial proceedings. However, it possesses multiple weaknesses. First, it 
does not speak directly to the issue of full interpretation of removal proceedings because it does 
not seem to govern immigration courts.
144
 The Act refers to U.S. District Courts, and 
immigration courts do not fall into this category.
145
 However, because the Court Interpreters Act 
was meant to alleviate problems that arise when limited English proficient individuals find 
themselves as defendants in federal courts,
146
 it should include immigration courts, which the 
federal government is responsible for. Even if immigration courts were considered district courts 
under the meaning of the statute, the Act would not require the appointment of an interpreter in 
immigration proceedings due to their civil nature because the statute does not “mandate the 
appointment of interpreters in civil cases, but simply . . . require[s] that they be licensed once the 
court chooses to appoint them.”147 
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 Second, even if the immigration courts did fall under the Court Interpreters Act, the Act 
does not create necessary constitutional protections nor does it expand on the current 
constitutional safeguards.
148
 Rather, it just provides guidance for the use of interpreters to ensure 
that the quality of the interpretation remains above the constitutionally permissible threshold.
149
 
Third, it does not afford an automatic right to an interpreter under the statute, but rather gives the 
district judge too much discretion and not enough guidance on how to determine whether an 
individual needs an interpreter.
150
 District court judges are afforded wide discretion based on the 
belief that they know best because they have had the most contact with the defendant.
151
 
However, more contact with a defendant does not make a judge a linguistic expert able to 
determine the extent and nature of the interpretation needed. If district court judges are going to 
have vast discretion, they need to be properly trained on the specific necessities of an interpreter. 
For example, the EOIR provides guidance to its Immigration Judges on how to determine if an 
individual needs an interpreter through training and the Immigration Judge Bench Book.
152
  
 Fourth, the Act focuses on whether an individual speaks only or primarily a language 
other than English when determining whether an interpreter is required.
153
 This standard is 
insufficient when determining whether an individual needs an interpreter, especially when the 
standard can be met with consistent and clear responses that are brief and somewhat 
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 If the judge is asking “yes” or “no” questions, or simple every day questions like 
“what is your name,” an individual with very limited knowledge of the English language can be 
mistaken as understanding enough to not need an interpreter.
155
 Perhaps the defendant is too shy 
or proud to admit she does not understand English, or maybe she does not know that she has a 
right to an interpreter.
156
 Many people who studied Spanish in school might claim to understand 
Spanish and could answer simple questions, but they probably would not want to sit through a 
foreign judicial proceeding conducted solely in Spanish.
157
 The EOIR standard of limited 
English proficiency is much more acceptable because it is more likely to detect individuals who 
might have a slight understanding of English, but not enough to understand the judicial 
proceedings.
158
 These same individuals might slip through the cracks in a case where a judge is 
following the Court Interpreters Act to determine whether an individual needs an interpreter.
159
  
 The Court Interpreter Act possesses some positive aspects. At the very least, the Court 
Interpretation Act can be used as a minimum guideline for immigration courts. The Act’s 
purpose to ensure a party’s comprehension of proceedings and ability to communicate with the 
court is admirable and worth following.
160
 Another strength is the Court Interpreters Act requires 
simultaneous interpretation.
161
 It requires a word-for-word interpretation of everything relating to 
a trial in order to provide equal access to everything an English speaking individual would be 
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  This could provide protection of the right to interpretation for the foreign nationals 
in removal proceedings if the Court Interpreters Act included immigration courts. Word-for-
word interpretation ensures equality between non-English speaking and English speaking 
individuals and also provides an equal playing field for the foreign national to respond to the 
government’s case. 163  A judicial proceeding where a skilled English speaking government 
official goes up against a non-English speaking layperson is unfair especially when the non-
English speaking individual is not privy to the interpretation of the whole proceeding. If the 
Court Interpreters Act applied to immigration courts, it would be more enforceable than the 
EOIR policies, but unfortunately it does not apply.
164
 Even if it were enforceable, the rights 




B.  Common Law: Supreme Court Silence  
  
 A Supreme Court decision on full interpretation of removal proceedings would create a 
strong avenue for enforcing the right to an interpreter because it would be the law of the land and 
bind all lower courts, including immigration courts. This benefit would also unify all 
immigration courts across the country, which is essential because an individual’s rights should 
not be based on whether she finds herself in immigration proceedings in the Sixth Circuit versus 
the Ninth Circuit. However, the Supreme Court has not spoken directly to the issue of the right to 
interpretation of immigration proceedings, but has only found that removal proceedings are 
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similar to criminal proceedings.
166
 Unfortunately, this finding was merely dicta, and the court did 
not overturn the case that held deportation was civil in nature.
167
 Without the Supreme Court’s 
decision on the right to interpretation, Circuit Courts can differ on their understanding of this 
right, weakening enforcement.  
 Another strength of common law is Circuit Courts have found a need for the right to 
interpretation using other rights, but this strength is accompanied by the general weakness that 
none of the Circuit Courts decisions are binding on all immigration courts.
168
 For example, the 
Ninth Circuit has expressed that the due process clause, as it applies to removal proceedings, 
requires a full and fair hearing for foreign nationals and that a complete interpretation is 
fundamental to a full and fair hearing.
169
 Therefore, the individuals I saw in the Detroit 
Immigration Court who did not get a full interpretation of their removal proceedings did not get a 
full and fair hearing guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. However, because the Detroit 
Immigration Court is located in the Sixth Circuit and not the Ninth Circuit, it is not bound by the 
Ninth Circuit’s findings.  
 Furthermore, the Second Circuit found a need for interpretation by using the right to be 
present and cross-examine witnesses.
170
 The court provided strong arguments for the right to 
interpretation by acknowledging the implications a lack of an interpreter has on the fairness and 
integrity of our judicial system.
171
 Limited English proficient individuals will not know the 
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difference between a criminal proceeding and a civil proceeding and will likely see their 
experience as one that is more like a criminal proceeding.
172
 Not only can the outcome lead to 
the punishment of removal, limited English proficient individuals might believe the possible 
outcome includes death or imprisonment. Therefore, to uphold the fairness and integrity of our 
judicial system, we must provide full interpretation of removal proceedings to limited English 
proficient individuals, especially if their experiences with their governments’ judicial arms  
lacked due process.
173
 Providing clarity will help build trust and separate the United States from 
other governments that do not value due process. Even if we give foreign nationals all the rights 
and due process available, they may still think our system is as corrupt as another countries’ 
system that does not provide due process if we do not provide a right to interpretation. The 
Second Circuit findings are limited because they do not apply to all immigration courts due to 
jurisdictional restraints, and they focus on criminal proceedings.
174
  
 However, the Second Circuit moved the focus from criminal proceedings to removal 
proceedings when it found asylum seekers are entitled to due process protections.
175
 
Nevertheless, the holding did not explicitly require full interpretation of a hearing, but only 
interpretation sufficient enough to enable the foreign nationals to understand the proceedings and 
present their claims.
176
 Furthermore, this holding does not carry over to all immigration courts, it 
only binds those in the Second Circuit. 
 The major weakness in common law is the Circuit Courts limit their focus to criminal 
proceedings.
177
 Even though the courts mainly refer to the rights afforded criminal defendants, 
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these rights should apply to foreign nationals in removal proceedings because the nature of these 
proceedings more closely reflects criminal proceedings than civil proceedings.
178
 The Supreme 
Court has acknowledged this fact.
179
 Ideally, the Supreme Court should overrule the holding in 
Fong Yue Ting that recognized deportations as civil matters.
180
 This could expand the rights 
afforded criminal defendants to respondents in removal proceedings. The common law 
recognizes the importance of interpretation, but does not clearly grant the right to interpretation 
nor provide enough protection for it.
181
   
 
C. EOIR’s Meaningful Access Plan  
 
 The Executive Branch has been the most progressive of the three branches when it comes 
to the issue of a right to interpretation. It provides a right to full interpretation in removal 
proceedings along with related perks, but no protection.
182
 The number one strength of the EOIR 
policy is that it explicitly promises the right of a full and complete interpretation of removal 
proceedings.
183
 Another strength is that the EOIR provides multiple perks that go along with the 
right to interpretation, including promises of (1) effective communication at no cost to the LEP 
foreign national, (2) meaningful access equal to what is afforded English speaking individuals, 
(3) arrangements for interpreters at all hearings without requiring a prior request, and (4) fair, 
impartial, and timely adjudication of immigration proceedings.
184
 The EOIR also provides 
guidelines to identify limited English proficient individuals, which prevents individuals with low 
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proficiency from having to experience removal proceeding without an interpreter.
185
 The EOIR’s 
plan provides a right to a full and complete interpretation in removal proceedings and guidelines 
to make sure that those who need an interpreter get one.
186
    
 Unfortunately, the document explicitly states that there is no legal recourse for the failure 
to follow this plan.
187
 Without legal recourse, the right to full interpretation remains unprotected, 
and the Sixth Circuit is able to continue removal proceedings without interpreting the whole 
proceeding. This expands the gap in the access to justice for limited English proficient 




D. DOJ Pressure, ABA Standards, and International Human Rights Treaty 
 
 The three branches of government acknowledge the need for interpreters, but the 
Legislative and Judicial Branches do not explicitly provide a right; whereas, the Executive 
Branch does explicitly provide a right, but does not adequately protect it.
189
 The Department of 
Justice and American Bar Association’s campaigns to expand use of interpreters to civil 
proceedings along with the International Human Rights treaty’s guarantee of a right to 
interpretation can provide ammunition in the fight to ensure full interpretation for removal 
proceedings.
190
 The American Bar Association’s Standards for Language Access in Courts 
encourages the expansion of interpretation to all tribunal proceedings.
191
 That means, unlike the 
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Court Interpreters Act, the ABA standards apply to immigration courts, which are tribunals. 
Furthermore, the ABA standards encourage civil courts to provide interpreters to ensure access 
to justice for all individuals.
192
 The ABA’s standards might influence Circuit Courts, or even the 




 The Department of Justice has pressured state courts to expand their policies regarding 
interpreters to civil proceedings in order to provide more access to LEP individuals.
194
 This 
movement toward expanding the right to interpreters in civil cases can provide support for a 
Supreme Court decision or Circuit Court decision expanding the right to civil cases.
195
 The 
decision could provide enforcement of the right to interpretation in immigration courts, which 
are considered civil in nature. Perhaps the Department of Justice could apply similar pressure to 
the EOIR to ensure that the agency enforces its own policy to provide full interpretation in 
removal proceedings. However, the DOJ probably overlooked enforcement in immigration 
courts, believing the issue has been taken care of through the EOIR policy that promises to 
provide full interpretation of all proceedings where an interpreter is present.
196
 
 The Department of Justice’s efforts to enforce compliance of state courts with Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may provide a roadmap on how to enforce the right to full 
interpretation of removal proceedings.
197
 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires state 
courts that receive federal funds must provide interpreters in all civil cases, and the Supreme 
Court has found that public funds generated by taxpayers of all races cannot contribute to 
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anything that encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in discrimination.
198
 The EOIR is a 
federally funded and federally operated agency that cannot participate in discrimination by 
providing fewer benefits to those who do not speak English.
199
 Foreign nationals who reside in 
the United States legally or illegally contribute to taxes regardless of their ability to speak 
English, and when they find themselves in immigration proceedings, they are entitled to the same 
rights afforded English speakers.
200
 Limited English proficient foreign nationals who find 
themselves in the Sixth Circuit are disadvantaged due to their nationality compared to those who 
are in another circuit where the full proceeding is interpreted and to those who have an 
understanding of the English language.
201
 This discrimination cannot be tolerated.  
 International Human Rights can support the fight for the right to interpretation in two 
ways. First, the courts can look to International Human rights to determine what other civilized 
countries do in similar situations. Second, Congress can look to the ICCPR for guidance on how 
to explicitly grant a right to interpretation in a statute.
202
 If removal proceedings were recognized 
as criminal proceedings, the right to an interpreter might be recognized in removal proceedings 
under International Human Rights law as well as domestic law.  
 Using International law to enforce this right has two flaws. First, International Human 
Rights law only explicitly guarantees the right to an interpreter to criminal defendants, not civil 
parties.
203
 Furthermore, it does not provide a right to an interpreter to a criminal defendant who 
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understands or speaks the language of the court but prefers to speak another language.
204
 Perhaps 
criminal defendants do not deserve the comfort of speaking their first language when faced with 
heinous criminal charges. However, individuals in removal proceedings who have not committed 
a crime, but find themselves in this civil proceeding, should have an ounce of comfort afforded 
them if they prefer to speak their first language, especially if they have been subjected to the 
discomfort and undue punishment of detainment in the general population of a prison.
205
 This 
right might be asking too much, but if the United States insists on treating immigration 
proceedings as civil matters, then the foreign nationals in these proceedings should be treated 
civilly, not like criminals.
206
 Second, although the United States is a party to the ICCPR, the 
enforcement of International Human Rights law is weak. Therefore, asserting a right under 
International law will take longer and will be harder than asserting the right under domestic laws.  
 Human decency alone should persuade the argument that a right to full interpretation of 
removal proceedings should exist because without one, an individual can find herself in an 
“incomprehensible storm of events” that swirl around her. 207  This unknown adds to the 
frustration, fear, and helplessness an individual with limited English proficiency may feel when 
facing a removal proceeding. Furthermore, foreign nationals might not trust the judicial system 
based on their experiences with their governments’ judicial systems. How the United States 
treats foreign nationals in removal proceedings is a reflection of our foreign relations and can 
impact how other nations treat our citizens who find themselves in their judicial or immigration 
system. The United States should set the precedent on how to treat immigrants humanely when 
they come in contact with judicial proceedings. 
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III. SUGGESTIONS TO ENSURE THE RIGHT TO FULL INTERPRETATION OF REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 
 The need for a right to interpretation is apparent, as each branch of government has 
recognized.
208
 Although protection of this right is lacking, multiple solutions exist to ensure and 
protect the right of interpretation.
209
 First, Congress could expressly grant the right to 
interpretation in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), using guidance from the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and EOIR’s Meaningful Access Plan.210 
Amending the INA would ensure that the immigration courts were bound by this statute. 
Furthermore, Congress could clarify any misunderstanding to what the right entails if it clearly 
affords the right to a full interpretation of all immigration hearings that need an interpreter.
211
 
This would be the strongest and most effective solution. However, Congress does not move 
quickly and amending the INA to provide this right could take too long.  
 Another slow option that could provide adequate protection is a Supreme Court decision 
specifically regarding the right to an interpreter in judicial proceedings.
212
 Someone with 
standing could litigate whether the failure to provide a full interpretation of a removal proceeding 
violates the right to a full and fair hearing.
213
 An alternative approach could include litigating 
whether removal proceedings are more like criminal proceedings than civil proceedings, 
deserving equal rights granted criminal defendants.
214
 Another case could be brought alleging 
that the failure to provide full interpretation of removal proceedings results in a violation of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
215
 Unfortunately, litigation is slow, costly, and risky. If the Supreme 
Court finds a right to interpretation, it would apply to all courts, including immigration courts, 
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and would unify the country. However, the Supreme Court might not find the right exists at all, 
or might not speak directly to whether a right exists in removal proceedings.  
 Finally, the fastest, but least enforceable, solution is the EOIR could take control of its 
agency and enforces its policies on all the immigration courts. It has the budget to provide 
interpreters. The interpreters are already present in the courtroom. No excuse exists to support 
the failure to provide a full interpretation of the proceeding. Perhaps the EOIR just needs to 
become aware of the problem in order to fix it.   
CONCLUSION 
 The nature of removal proceedings is similar enough to criminal proceedings where the 
foreign nationals in removal proceedings should get the same rights as criminal defendants in 
United States and International criminal proceedings.
216
 The current statute regarding 
interpretation provides the most strength when it comes to enforcement, but affords the least 
rights and does not apply to removal proceedings.
217
 The court cases with the potential to create 
enforcement of the right to interpretation were mostly focused on criminal proceedings, were not 
decided by the Supreme Court, and did not speak directly to the issue of complete interpretation 
of removal proceedings.
218
 The EOIR Meaningful Access Plan speaks more directly to the right 
of complete interpretation of removal proceedings, but is merely aspirational and has no 
enforcement measures.
219
 Current laws and policies acknowledge the need for the right to 
interpretation, but do not provide adequate protection.
220
 Due process is fundamental to justice, 
and the right of a foreign national to understand the judicial process she is experiencing is 
                                                        
216
 See supra text accompanying notes 11-15. 
217
 See supra Part II.A. 
218
 See supra Part II.B. 
219
 See supra Part II.C.-D. 
220
 See supra Part II.A-D.  
 38 
fundamental to due process.
221
 Therefore, the right to full interpretation of removal proceedings 
is fundamental to justice.
222
 Justice requires the Detroit Immigration Court to stop its practice of 
interpreting only questions and answers and provide a full interpretation of the proceedings 
instead.  
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